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Abstract
This paper investigates three consequences of the new financial regulation: the agency
costs, the monitoring costs and the eﬀect on banks’ cost of capital. For the first, the
shareholders’ behaviour is analysed as a trade-oﬀ between the value of the bank and its
volatility by using an indiﬀerence curve model of the bank’s choice of optimal risk. While
the first-best optimal risk maximises the value of the bank, the shareholders select sub-
optimally high risks under bail-in structures. This leads to both the wealth transfer and
the value destruction agency costs. For the second, as a result of these consequences of the
DAPR (Deviation from the Absolute Priority Rule) the bondholders are forced to closely
monitor the bank behaviour. Requiring higher rate of return for higher risk, reflecting the
costs of monitoring, is shown to alleviate the agency problems. Diﬀerent types of covenants
are proposed as an eﬃcient way of implementing this solution. For the third, the impact of
∗Department of Economics, Mathematics and Statistics, Birkbeck, University of London, Malet Street, Lon-
don, WC1E 7HX, UK. Email: k.hori@bbk.ac.uk.
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the new bail-in structure and the monitoring costs on the WACC of 16 largest European
banks is estimated, and is shown to increase the cost of capital by between 75% and 110%.
JEL Classification: D82; G21; G28; G32
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1 Introduction
The new financial regulation aims to impose losses on bondholders on a going concern basis.
This new regime, bail-in using contingent convertible (CoCo) bonds, where bondholders as-
sume losses before the equity is fully depleted, is an implementation of the Deviation from the
Absolute Priority Rule (DAPR).1 This paper investigates two consequences of this implemen-
tation: the agency costs and the impact on the banks’ cost of capital.
The introduction of DAPR implies that the shareholders’ incentive to extract wealth via
“looting” or to undertake “gamble-for-resurrection” (the traditional “risk-shifting” or over-
investment problem) is aggravated as the bank’s balance sheet deteriorates, since they know
their maximum loss is limited at the CoCo trigger (if the bond is a write-down/oﬀ type) or
with further dilution (if the CoCo is an equity-conversion type).2 This gives rise to agency
costs of wealth transfer and value destruction as the bank’s solvency deteriorates and heads
towards the PONV (Point of Non Viability). We extend our previous analyses of these agency
costs in Hori and Martin Ceron (2014) by developing an optimal volatility model of firms using
shareholders’ indiﬀerence curves. This enables us to propose a solution to alleviate the agency
problem.
More specifically, as demonstrated in Hori and Martin Ceron (2014), the agency problem
can be construed as a sale of an option structure from the bondholders to the shareholders,
where the buyer of the option, the shareholders, have the right to choose its volatility. The
question that can be asked is then what the chosen level of volatility is, and how it is aﬀected
1The Absolute Priority Rule (APR) is where the shareholders lose all their holdings before the bondholders
are aﬀected, as in the theoretical write-down of losses. DAPR deviates from this by imposing losses on the
bondholders before the shareholders are completely wiped out.
2As underscored by Hori and Martin Ceron (2014), the equity-conversion CoCo bond is a NADES (Non-
Admissible Debt to Equity Swap), and thus the dilution of shareholders is lower than it would be if they had
to issue private equity at distressed share price levels at such low solvency levels.
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by the new bail-in structures. The vast theory of firm literature does not tell us how a firm
selects its optimal level of risk. Under the Absolute Priority Rule (APR) the shareholders
have a payoﬀ structure that is a call option (their loss is limited to their current position,
while the potential income upside is unbounded). The positive vega position3 of an option
means that the value of the shareholders’ position increases as the volatility increases. There
is, however, no solution to the shareholders’ optimal risk selection problem. In this paper,
we develop a model of firm where a firm’s activities are a portfolio of correlated projects,
with uncertain future values and independent project-specific risks. Analogous to Markowitz’s
portfolio theory, there is a concave risk-future value “portfolio frontier” (here termed “project
plans”). The crucial point is that the future values are discounted at the required rate of return
for the associated risk, leading to better diversified project plans to be discounted at a lower
rate. This results in a trade-oﬀ between the present value of the firm, 0, and its associated
risk, . The first-best optimal choice of risk maximises the value of the firm. The shareholders’
choice of risk is determined by their indiﬀerence curves that is a loci of the pairs (0 ) that
yields the same present value of their position. They choose the highest indiﬀerence curve that
is feasible with the firm’s possible project plan, given by the one that is tangent to the project
plans curve. Diﬀerent bail-out / bail-in structures have diﬀerent set of indiﬀerence curves,
with steeper indiﬀerence curves yielding higher optimal risk choices. Our analysis shows that
higher leverage means higher risk choice, and for reasonable levels of leverage, the shareholders
choose risks in the ascending order for the cases of expropriation (where the shareholders
are completely wiped out as the government takes over the firm), government bail-out, and
bondholder bail-ins with equity-conversion CoCo bond and write-oﬀ CoCo bond, respectively.
The choice of higher volatility means a transfer of wealth from bondholders to shareholders
(from the seller of the option to the buyer), while the sub-optimal solution (i.e. non-value
maximising) means value destruction.
Given this result, the next question asked is whether there is a way of alleviating the
shareholders’ incentive for high risk-taking. Using the above model, we are able to show that
by imposing higher required rate of return for higher risk-taking, the shareholders will rationally
3The sensitivity of the value of an option, , with respect to the volatility of the underlying asset price, ,
i.e.   =  .
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reduce the risk-level chosen. In policy terms this is analogous to Pigovian tax. The agency
costs are the negative externality of shareholders’ actions on the remaining stakeholders of the
bank. By implementing higher costs on their action, the regulators can force the shareholders
to select less risky choice. Alternatively, leaving it to the bondholders, this is akin to them
demanding higher cost of debt, compensating them for their cost of closely monitoring the
credit quality of the firm. The monitoring eﬀorts that the bondholders are forced to bear
due to their exposure to going concern losses translate into a cost that will be borne by the
shareholders in the end via a higher cost of capital. This fact has been overlooked by the
regulator and the market so far.
So how do we implement this idea in practice? We believe that the most eﬃcient way
for bondholders to monitor the credit quality and risk-taking profile of the bank is through
the utilisation of covenants, mirroring the practice in the corporate bond market. Here we
propose diﬀerent types of covenants within the CoCo indentures as ways of tackling agency
costs. When the firm’s solvency is reasonably high, we propose a “ratchet” coupon financial
accounting covenant. With a rise in the leverage ratio the ratchet is triggered, automatically
increasing the cost of debt and the return on equity of the firm. Both the concave nature of the
shareholders’ return on equity (at each ratchet trigger point there is a step down in the ROE),
and the higher cost of capital once triggered (as suggested above) discourage shareholders from
taking higher risk. We show that this type of covenants are eﬀective when the firm’s solvency is
high, but loses its eﬀectiveness as the firm’s balance sheet approaches the critical points (CoCo
trigger or the PONV). Theoretically this is due to the quasi-concave nature of the indiﬀerence
curves (the curve turns less concave, and eventually convex, at the low 0 / high  end);
intuitively, near the critical point the allure of "gamble-for-ressurection" negates the positive
eﬀect of the ratchet coupon covenant. Therefore we suggest the use of this type of covenant
at the CoCo bond inception while the solvency is high. In the falling solvency scenario we
propose a diﬀerent type of covenants, specifically asset sweep and debt sweep covenants. In
the former the asset is partially sold oﬀ to pay down some of the debt, while in the latter
newly issued debt is used to repay existing debts. Both discourage (or prevent, in the debt
sweep case) shareholders from piling on more debt to attempt "gamble-for-ressurection". The
mechanisms of both of these types of covenants are outlined in detail in the text.
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In Hori and Martin Ceron (2014) we argued that the high vega and the low delta4 of
the shareholders’ value for the CoCo bond bail-in structures implied that the agency costs
are higher under these than under expropriation (i.e. no bail-out / bail-in). Here, we also
argue that the steeper indiﬀerence curves for the CoCo bail-in (which again is due to higher
vega and lower delta, as the slope of indiﬀerence curves is the negative of the ratio of vega
to delta) means that there is higher wealth transfer and value destruction. However these
analyses are undertaken assuming equal cost of capital under all structures. How the new bail-
in structure aﬀects banks’ WACC is the second consequence of the Basel III regulation that we
investigate in this paper. Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig and Pfleiderer (2011) argue that higher
equity requirements under the new regulation would lower both the cost of equity and the cost
of debt, and therefore despite the change in the funding mix (more equity which has the higher
cost), the weighted-average cost of capital (WACC) should remain unchanged. In contrast, we
believe that the WACC would meaningfully rise on the back of bail-in (especially at the senior
debt level) and the monitoring costs (throughout the entire unsecured debt). To demonstrate
this, we estimate the pre- and post-Basel III WACC for the 16 largest European banks using
the September 2014 quarterly reports and the market data as of beginning of October 2014,
under sensible assumptions. A sensitivity analysis is then undertaken to test the robustness
of the results on our assumptions. This yields a range of possible WACC estimates which are
75% to 110% higher than the current WACC level.5 This will have eﬀects on the behaviours
of the bank, some of which are discussed in the concluding remarks.
So far the literature on agency costs associated with CoCo bond bail-in has focused mainly
on highlighting the over-investment problem (for example Berg and Kaserer (2011), Hori and
Martin Ceron (2014), Koziol and Lawrenz (2012), Pennacchi, Vermaelen and Wolf (2014) and
Hilscher and Raviv (2014)). None of these consider bondholders’ monitoring cost, which is
ultimately borne by shareholders via higher cost of capital, as a mean to alleviate the agency
problem. Jensen and Meckling (1976) investigates the role of monitoring cost in the context
4The sensitivity of the value of an option, , with respect to the price of the underlying asset price, , i.e.
∆ =  .
5The argument goes as follows. Despite banks having the incentive to issue secured debt (out of the scope
of Bail I), they still have to issue unsecured debt which falls within the Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC)
ratio and issue long term debt to meet the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). This comes at a cost that filters
through to the overall cost of debt, which we believe will outweigh the supposedly lower cost of equity.
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of a trade-oﬀ between firm value and non-pecuniary benefit for the managers of a firm. Their
indiﬀerence curve analysis is akin to the one developed here. In a wider sense, our model
contributes to the broader literature of theory of firm, in successfully answering the question:
“How does a firm decide its optimal risk?” Whereas previous works point out the positive vega
of the shareholders’ position as the root of a firm’s over-investment problem (e.g. Eberhart
and Senbet (1993), Berg and Kaserer (2011), Hori and Martin Ceron (2014)), which leaves the
question of “Then why do firms not keep increasing its risk-taking?”, our optimal volatility
model is able to answer this question specifically which leads to concrete policy suggestions.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the optimal volatility model using
indiﬀerence curves, to show that bail-out / bail-in structures result in higher risk-taking by
the shareholders and higher value destruction for the firm. This is shown to be alleviated if
higher required rate of return can be applied to higher risk-taking behaviour. In doing so, we
emphasise the role that bondholders’ monitoring costs will play as a result of the introduction
of the bail-in structures. In Section 3 we suggest a practical way of implementing this by
proposing financial and non-financial covenants in the CoCo bond indenture. In Section 4 we
estimate the post-Basel III WACC for a sample of banks given the new solvency and liquidity
rules within the bail-in framework, to show that the cost of capital of the banks is poised to
rise sharply. Finally, Section 5 gives concluding remarks.
2 Indiﬀerence Curve Analysis
Consider a bank that raises fund by equity and debt. The fund is invested in a portfolio of
projects, whose outcomes are uncertain. Then for risk-averse investors, the present value of the
bank’s asset value is estimated using an appropriate risk-adjusted discount rate. The optimal
portfolio decision is then dependent on the risk-return profiles of the feasible project mixes.
In particular there may be a trade-oﬀ between higher risk-taking, leading to a possible higher
expected outcome at maturity, and higher discounted rate. There is, so far, nothing in the
literature that suggests how the bank selects its optimal portfolio under such scenario.
Here we build a model of a simple bank with two possible investment projects with uncertain
outcomes. Assuming suﬃciently low correlation between the two outcomes, there is a risk-
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diversification eﬀect in choosing a portfolio of the two projects. This results in a higher
present value of the portfolio due to a lower risk-adjusted rate required for discounting. Under
a simple condition then there exists an interior solution to the bank’s maximum value, which
is the bank’s first-best choice of portfolio. However the decision of portfolio selection is taken
by the shareholders, whose convex payoﬀ structure (they gain fully from the bank’s success,
but their loss is limited) means that their optimisation behaviour of the value of their holdings
would lead to a sub-optimal choice of portfolio selection. This can be analysed using an
indiﬀerence curve model, similar to that adopted by Jensen and Meckling (1976) in their
analysis of monitoring of the behaviour of the managers with non-pecuniary benefits. The
indiﬀerence curves describe the trade-oﬀ between risk (volatility) and value, as described above,
and are therefore downward-sloping. The curves are also quasi-concave in shape: it is concave
when the value of the bank is high, while it becomes convex as the solvency drops towards the
Point of Non Viability (PONV), particularly when a bail-out or a bail-in would put a floor to
the value of the shareholders’ position. The shareholders’ choice of portfolio is given by the
tangent point between the bank’s possible project portfolio frontier and their highest attainable
indiﬀerence curve. The choice of the second-best portfolio results in a lower present value of
the bank’s asset value, as well as a transfer of value from the bondholders to the shareholders
due to higher risk taken. These represent the two types of agency costs, namely the value
destruction and the wealth transfer. We analyse these under diﬀerent restructuring scenarios
of expropriation (i.e. no bail-out or bail-in), government bail-out with preference / ordinary
shares, bail-in with equity-conversion CoCo bonds and bail-in with write-oﬀ CoCo bonds.
The set-up diﬀers from the traditional models in two ways. Firstly, it assumes the distri-
bution of possible future outcomes of projects to be given, which is then discounted to today
to estimate the present values. Thus the choice of projects aﬀect the present value, not only
through the chosen expected future value, but also via its eﬀect on the required discount rate.
This diﬀers from the Merton (1974) set-up, where the future values of a security is given as a
distribution of outcomes given today’s value of the security.6 Secondly the model contrasts with
6Jensen and Meckling (1976) make the same point when they state, “While we used the option pricing model
above to motivate the discussion and provide some intuitive understanding of the incentives facing the equity
holders, the option pricing solutions of Black and Scholes (1973) do not apply when incentive eﬀects cause 
to be a function of the debt/equity ratio as it is in general and in this example. Long (1974) points out this
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the CAPM set-up where the securities are priced assuming that all of idiosyncratic risk have
been diversified away, which cannot be assumed for the limited number of possible projects
available to a bank.
2.1 Bank’s Project Plans
The bank has two possible projects,  = 1 2, both of which mature at  . Their expected value
and variance are given by  £  ¤ and 2 , with correlation . A “project plan” is given by the
weights ( 1− ) of the two projects, and has the expected value and the variance,
 [ ()] =  £ 1 ¤+ (1− ) £ 2 ¤
2 () = 221 + (1− )2 22 + 2 (1− ) 12.
(1)
Assume project 1 is riskier than project 2, i.e.  £ 1 ¤   £ 2 ¤ and 1  2. Then in
minimising 2 () with respect to  ∈ (0 1), for low enough , namely  ∈
h
−1 21
´
, there
exists a minimum-variance plan min with min  2 given by,
min = 22−1221+22−212
min =  (min) = (1−
2)2122
21+22−212 .
(2)
Project plans  ∈ [min 1] then represent the set of eﬃcient plans, with  ∈ [min 1]. In this
region then,

  0 for  ∈ (min 1] (3)
where

 =
1

£21 − (1− )22 + (1− 2) 12¤ . (4)
Fig 1 depicts the graph of  [ ] for diﬀerent values of  ∈ [0 1], with its minimum-variance
plan and the eﬃcient plans on the upper branch.
The bank discounts the chosen project plan at the risk-adjusted rate  (  ()), where
diﬃculty with respect to the usefullness of the model in the context of tax subsidies on interest and bankruptcy
cost. The results of Merton (1974) and Galai and Masulis (1976) must be interpreted with care since the
solutions are strictly incorrect in the contect of tax subsidies and/or agency costs.”
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Figure 1: Expected bank value  [ ] for diﬀerent values of 
  0. The current market value of the bank is then given by,
0 () = −(()) [ ()] . (5)
2.2 The First-best Optimal Plan
The first-best optimal plan for the bank is ∗ such that
∗ = arg max∈[min1]0 () . (6)
To find the optimal plan we compute and equate to zero the derivative,
0
 () = −


−(()) [ ()] + −(()) ¡ £ 1 ¤− £ 2 ¤¢ . (7)
To rule out corner solutions, we require 0 (min)  0 and 0 (1)  0. In particular, for the
case  (  ()) ≡  ( ())⇒  =   , as  = 0 at  = min,
0
 (min) = 
−(min) ¡ £ 1 ¤− £ 2 ¤¢  0. (8)
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Figure 2: Bank’s present value 0 for diﬀerent values of 
As this is strictly positive the solution cannot be at this point, i.e. ∗  min. At  = 1, as
then  [ (1)] =  £ 1 ¤,  (1) = 1 and  (1) = 1 − 2,
0
 (1) = 
−(11)
∙
−  (1 − 2)
£ 1 ¤+ ¡ £ 1 ¤− £ 2 ¤¢¸ . (9)
Then for an interior solution ∗ that satisfies
0
 (
∗) = 0, (10)
we require 0 (1)  0, i.e.  £ 1 ¤− £ 2 ¤
 (1 − 2) £ 1 ¤   (1) . (11)
What condition (11) implies is that, for an internal solution, the project plan risk needs to be
suﬃciently costly (the right-hand side is large), or else the bank would simply choose ∗ = 1,
i.e. only invest in the project with the highest expected value. Fig 2 depicts the graph of the
present value 0. The optimal plan ∗ is given by the curve’s maximum point.7
7Fig 2 is simluated using the linear average market price of risk case given in Example 2.
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Example 1 (Constant Market Price of Risk)
 (  ()) =  + . (12)
where  is the constant market price of risk and  is the market risk-free rate. Then  = 0
and  =  and so an internal solution exists for   [
1 ]−[ 2 ]
 (1−2)[ 1 ]
.
Example 2 (Linear Average Market Price of Risk)
 (  ()) =  +  () () . (13)
where  () is given by the weighted average of the respective market prices of risk of the two
projects, 1 and 2,
 () = 1 + (1− )2. (14)
For our numerical analyses in this section we use the linear average market price of risk
given in Example 2.
2.2.1 Discussion: CAPM
As opposed to the above example, in the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) the risk-
adjusted rate of return is linear in ,
 () =  [1] + (1− ) [2] =  + [1 + (1− )2] (15)
where  is the market risk premium  =  [ ] −  and  [ ] is the expected
market return rate. In this case then,  = (1 − 2) , and so,
0
 () = − (1 − 2) 
−() [ ()] + −() ¡ £ 1 ¤− £ 2 ¤¢ , (16)
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for which,
0 (1) = − (1 − 2) −[1]
£ 1 ¤+ −[1] ¡ £ 1 ¤− £ 2 ¤¢
= [1−  (1 − 2) ] −[1]
£ 1 ¤− −[1] £ 2 ¤
≈ − (1−2) ¡−[1] £ 1 ¤−  (1−2) −[1] £ 2 ¤¢
= − (1−2) ¡ 10 −  20 ¢ .
(17)
This is positive assuming  10   20 . Hence there is no internal solution for the optimal plan
for the bank. Specifically, the bank would always simply choose the riskier project 1.
The reason for this is that, with CAPM, the project-specific idiosyncratic risks are assumed
to have been diversified away. In contrast in the constant and linear average  examples, for
 low enough there is enough risk-diversification eﬀect, such that a combination of the two
projects would have higher present value than the present values of the single projects due to
the lower risk-adjusted discount rate.
2.3 Shareholders’ Choice of Risk
In the above section we established the bank’s first-best choice of risk. However it is the
shareholders who choose the bank’s project plan. In this section we investigate their choice
under diﬀerent restructuring scenarios of expropriation, government bail-out, equity-conversion
CoCo bond bail-in and write-oﬀ CoCo bond bail-in. For this we build a model of indiﬀerence
curve analysis. The payoﬀs and the valuations under Merton (1974) framework for each of the
restructuring scenarios are given in Appendix C, the derivations of which are given in detail
in Hori and Martin Ceron (2015).
The simple firm considered is financed by equity capital and discount bonds with maturity
 . The total face value of the bonds is  , which may include equity-conversion CoCo bond
(face value ) or write-oﬀ CoCo bond (face value  ). The face value of the plain vanilla
bond is . Therefore the firm can either have  =  (expropriation or government bail-out),
 =  +  (equity-conversion CoCo bond bail-in) or  =  +  (write-oﬀ CoCo bond
bail-in). The total asset value at time  is  , which is split between the stakeholders. The
bail-in bonds trigger at the capital ratio of  . There is a minimum capital ratio of , applied
to both preference and ordinary shares, which the regulators insist on after a rescue. Similarly,
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where the rescue is in the form of preference shares, there is a minimum common equity floor
of  for ordinary shares.
2.3.1 Expropriation
Expropriation occurs when there is no bail-out or bail-in by either the government or the
bondholders. All of the loss incurred is therefore borne firstly by the shareholders, then by the
bondholders, according to the Absolute Priority Rule (APR). As stated, we assume there to
be a minimum capital ratio, , under which the government injects capital in order to restore
the balance sheet to 1− . The payoﬀs to the shareholders and bondholders at time  in this
no bail-out / bail-in scenario is well established in the literature. Specifically, the shareholders’
payoﬀ equals the call option payoﬀ with strike price  , the value of which is given by the
familiar Black-Scholes option pricing formula,
  =  ( ) (18)
where  () is the value of a call option with strike price  given by,
() = 0 (1 ())− − (2 ())
with 1 () = ln
0

+

+2
2


√ and 2 () = 1 ()− 
√ .
(19)
 is the volatility of the plan chosen and  is the risk-free rate. The superscript  indicates
the case of no bail-out / in.
The shareholders’ indiﬀerence curves (ICs) are defined as the loci of pairs (0 ) that yields
the same value of   , i.e. all values of 0 and  such that,
  (0 ) =  (20)
for a given value of  . We list some properties of the ICs:
Properties 1 (Shareholders’ Indiﬀerence Curves) The ICs have the following proper-
ties:
1. The ICs are downward-sloping.
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2. The ICs are quasi-concave.
3. Given   , the IC steepens as  increases, pivoted at  =∞.
Proof. From the definition of the ICs,
  = 
0 0 + 
  = 0
⇔ 0 = − 
 
  0 = −

∆ = .
(21)
 is the marginal rate of substitution between 0 and  along the IC, and,
∆ =  (1)
 = 0√ 0 (1) .
(22)
Immediately, ICs are downward-sloping as both ∆ and  are strictly positive,
 = −0
√ 0 (1)
 (1)  0. (23)
To check the curvature of the ICs, consider the limits of . First when it becomes large, using
the limiting properties of call option values outlined in Properties B1 of Appendix B,
lim→∞
 = 0 (24)
i.e. the shareholders’ position approximates the asset value. Therefore at this point ∆ = 1 and
 = 0, and hence  → 0 as  becomes large. At the other limit when  approaches
zero,
lim→0
 = max
£0 − −  0¤ . (25)
On an IC where    0 then, 0 must unambiguously be greater than − as  →
0. Therefore, at this point the shareholders’ position approximates the value of the forward
0 − − , and thus again ∆ = 1 and  = 0, making  → 0 as  → 0. Given
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that   0 for  ∈ (0∞), the curves must therefore be quasi-concave.8 Finally, as 
increases 0 has to adjust in order to keep   constant for given ,
  = 
  + 
0 0 = 0
⇔ 0 = − 
 
  0 =
−(2)
(1)  0 for  ∞.
(27)
Thus the IC shifts up. To show that this shift is a steepening of the curve pivoted at  =∞,
note first that lim→∞ 0 = 0. At any other values of ,

 =

 +

0
0
=
h
− 0 
0(1)
(1)
³
1 +  0(1)(1)
´i
+
h  0(1)
(1)
³
2 +  0(1)(1)
´i −(2)
(1)
= −  0(1)(1)
h  (1) ³1 +  0(1)(1) ´+ √ −(2)(1) i  0.
(28)
The final line is negative ∀  ∞ as each term within it are positive except for 1, and
 ()+ 0 ()  0 ∀ which is shown in Property A2 of Appendix A. Thus the ICs steepens
as  increases.
These properties are demonstrated in Fig 3. The shareholders’ optimisation problem is the
selection of the highest attainable indiﬀerence curve given project plans (5). Diagrammatically,
the solution is given by the tangent point shown in Fig 4. The graph suggests that the
shareholders would choose a higher risk project plan  than the bank’s first-best choice ∗.
More formally,
Proposition 1   ∗.
Proof. The shareholders’ choice of the optimal project plan is determined by,
max∈[min1]
  =  ( ) subject to 0 () = −(()) [ ()] . (29)
8The curvature of the ICs is given by,
20
2 =


0


+

0
0

 0
 = −
0√

 0 (1)
 (1)
 0 (1)
 (1) + 2
2
+ 2√

. (26)
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The solution  is the  that satisfies,
 
 () =
 
0
0
 +
 


 =  (1 ( ))
0
 () + 0
√ 0 (1 ( ))  () = 0. (30)
But at ∗, we know from (10) that 0 (∗) = 0. On the other hand   0 for  ∈ [min 1],
and hence 
  0 at ∗. Thus   ∗.
The indiﬀerence curve analysis is particularly useful as it demonstrates clearly the agency
costs associated with having the shareholders as the decision maker of firm’s risk-taking. As
proved the shareholders select a higher risk project plan  compared with the firm value
maximising ∗. Immediately then, by shareholders optimising the value of their holdings and
not that of the firm, it results in value destruction of the firm. This is one type of agency
costs. The other type is the wealth transfer. The shareholders’ position is a long call option as
given above, the value of which increases with the increase in the risk chosen. In contrast the
bondholders hold a short put option,
  = − −  ( ) (31)
where  () is the value of a put option with strike price  given by,
 () = −0 (−1 ()) + − (−2 ()) , (32)
and 1 () and 2 () are given in (19). Put-call parity9 implies that   decreases by the
same amount as the increase in   with the increase in the risk. The shareholders’ choice
of  away from the first-best ∗ therefore results in the wealth being transferred from the
bondholders to the shareholders.
We can also state the following:
Proposition 2 The risk-taking is higher, the higher the leverage.
9The put-call parity states that, for a non-dividend paying underlying asset, the value of a call option plus
a bond equals the value of a put option plus the underlying asset, i.e.  () +− =  () + . As values
of the bond or the underlying asset do not depend on the volatility of the underlying asset price, an increase in
the volatility therefore must induce the same increase in the values of the call and the put options.
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Proof. This follows immediately from the third property of Properties 1 - the steeper the IC,
the further along to the right the tangent point is in Fig 4.
This implies higher agency costs for higher leveraged banks.
2.3.2 Government Bail-out
In the above expropriation case, in the worst case scenario both shareholders and bondholders
would lose all of their holdings. Here the government bails out both stakeholders so that
their positions are guaranteed at the minimum common equity floor  and  , respectively.
Additionally, in order to attain the minimum capital ratio  the government makes a further
capital injection of  and the balance sheet is restored to 1− . This capital injection could
be in the form of preference shares or ordinary shares.
As given in Appendix C the value of shareholders’ position when there is government
bail-out is,
  = 1− − +
³
 + 1−
´
=  ( ) +
h

³
 + 1−
´
−  ( )
i
.
(33)
where  () and  () are given by (19) and (32), respectively. The second line is derived
using the put-call parity of Black-Scholes option pricing model, and it reflects better the
government bail-out guarantee which is expressed as a long put bear spread, 
³
 + 1−
´
−
 ( ). As with the expropriation case the shareholders’ choice can be investigated using their
indiﬀerence curves:
Proposition 3 The ICs are steeper for the bail-out case than for the expropriation case.
Proof. Consider the ICs,  and , with the same values for shareholders   =   
0. First investigate what happens when  → 0. Applying Properties B1 in Appendix B,
lim→0
 = lim→0
 = 0 − − (34)
Hence  0 (0) =  0 (0) at  = 0, where  0 () and  0 () are the values of 0 required
to attain a given shareholders’ value  when the volatility is . For   0, given that
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
³
 + 1−
´
  ( ), if  0 () =  0 () then      , strictly. Thus to have   =
  , it must be that  0 ()   0 (). Hence  is below  for   0.
Fig 5 demonstrates this result. Now Fig 4 suggests that the shareholders would choose a
higher risk project plan  than  under the expropriation case,
Proposition 4    .
Proof. This time the shareholders’ project plan choice  is determined by,
max∈[min1]
  = 1−
− + 
µ
 + 
1−
¶
subject to 0 () = −(()) [ ()] .
(35)
The solution  is the  that satisfies,
  () = 
0
0 +
  
= 
³
1
³
 + 1−
´´ 0 () + 0√ 0 ³1 ³ + 1− ´´  () = 0. (36)
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But at  ,
 

¡¢ = ∙− µ1µ + 
1−
¶¶  0 (1 ( ))
 (1 ( )) +
0
µ
1
µ
 + 
1−
¶¶¸
0
√ 
¡¢
(37)
Here 0
¡¢ was replaced using (30). As again   0 for  ∈ [min 1], this is positive if
and only if,
 0
³
1
³
 + 1−
´´

³
1
³
 + 1−
´´   0 (1 ( )) (1 ( )) . (38)
Given that 1
³
 + 1−
´
 1 ( ), this is true from Property A2.
Fig 6 demonstrates the eﬀect of the government bail-out. On the graph three ICs are
drawn together with the eﬃcient project plans frontier: the IC under expropriation, and two
ICs with government bail-out. Of the latter two, one intersects the project plans frontier at
the tangent point of the expropriation IC, while the other is the tangent IC to the project
plans frontier. Again, the graph demonstrates the steepening of the IC under the government
bail-out scenario compared with the expropriation case. This is caused by the increase in the
vega of the shareholders’ position due to the possibility of the bail-out (recall in (21) that the
slope of indiﬀerence curve is given by the ratio of the shareholders’ vega to delta positions).
The graph further shows, as a result of the steepening, that the shareholders would choose a
higher risk but lower value project plan by shifting out onto a higher IC to the right. This
demonstrates the aggravation of both value destruction and the wealth transfer agency costs
compared with the expropriation scenario.
2.3.3 Equity-conversion CoCo Bond Bail-in
Next we consider contingent convertible bond structures. We begin with the equity-conversion
CoCo bond. This is triggered to restore the capital ratio to the minimum level  when the pre-
conversion capital ratio falls below  . As opposed to the government bail-out case, there is no
external capital injection and therefore the balance sheet remains depleted. It is assumed that
when the CoCo bond is not enough to cover the loss incurred, then the regulator will exercise
its bail-in power to convert the necessary plain vanilla debt into ordinary shares to restore
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Figure 6: Wealth transfer and value destruction eﬀects
solvency. The details of the shareholders’ and bondholders’ payoﬀ schedules are discussed in
Hori and Martin Ceron (2015).
As noted in Appendix C, the value of shareholders’ position under equity-conversion CoCo
bond bail-in is given by,
  = 0 + (1− )
³ 
1−
´
=  ( ) +
h
(1− )
³ 
1−
´
−  ( )
i
.
(39)
The shareholders’ project plan choice  is then determined by,
max∈[min1]
  =  ( )+
∙
(1− )
µ 
1− 
¶
−  ( )
¸
subject to 0 () = −(()) [ ()] .
(40)
Then,
Proposition 5    .
Proof. Here we give an intuitive proof. (39) shows that the shareholders’ position under
equity-conversion CoCo bond bail-in is the expropriation position   =  ( ) plus a long
put bear spread-like structure, (1− )
³ 
1−
´
−  ( ). This latter structure represents the
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CoCo bail-in guarantee. For the range of values of 0 and  that we are interested the delta
of this long put bear spread is negative. The vega of a put bear spread is always positive.
This implies that ∆  ∆ and      . In (21) we derived that the slope of the
IC is the  which is the negative of the ratio of vega to delta. Therefore  is more
negative than  , implying a steeper IC under the equity-conversion CoCo bail-in than
under expropriation. Thus    .
2.3.4 Write-oﬀ CoCo Bond Bail-in
Finally, we consider the write-oﬀ CoCo bond bail-in. As opposed to the equity-conversion
CoCo bonds, for which partial conversion is possible, when the trigger occurs at the capital
ratio of  the whole of the write-oﬀ CoCo bond is immediately written oﬀ to cover the loss. It
is unclear what happens in reality to the remainder of the written-oﬀ bond when the write-oﬀ
more than covers the firm’s loss. Here, it is assumed that this net amount is added to the
shareholders’ position as contingent capital reserve. As with the equity-conversion case, with
no external capital injection, the balance sheet remains depleted after a loss. Again the payoﬀ
schedules are discussed in detail in Hori and Martin Ceron (2015).
With write-oﬀ CoCo bond bail-in the value of shareholders’ position is given by (see again
Appendix C),
  = 0 + (1− )
³ 
1−
´
− 
³ 
1−
´
=  ( ) + 
³ 
1−
´
−
h
 ( )− (1− )
³ 
1−
´i (41)
where  and  are the face values of the plain vanilla bond and the write-oﬀ CoCo bond
respectively, and  () and  () are the price of the binary call and put options with unit
payout at strike ,
 () = − (2 ())
 () = − (−2 ()) .
(42)
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The shareholders’ project plan choice  is then determined by,
max∈[min1]
 =  ( ) + 
µ 
1− 
¶
−
∙
 ( )− (1− )
µ 
1− 
¶¸
(43)
subject to 0 () = −(()) [ ()] .
Then,
Proposition 6    .
Proof. Very similar to the proof of Proposition 5.
2.4 Simulated Results
To compare the outcomes between the diﬀerent restructuring structures, we simulate the op-
timal risk chosen by the shareholders under the diﬀerent structures for varying values of  .
This is done by numerically solving the shareholders’ maximisation problems for each scenario,
namely (29), (35), (40) and (43), using Newton-Raphson numerical estimation to solve for the
values  such that   = 0 for  ∈ {}. This is then applied to (1) to compute
the optimal  (). The values used for the simulation are:  £ 1 ¤ = 130,  £ 2 ¤ = 115,
1 = 30%, 2 =%,  = 0, 1 = 05, 2 = 025,  = 1 and  = 3%. Where required, the
level of CoCo bond is assumed to be 10% of the total debt level, with the CoCo trigger level
 = 7%. For the solvency requirements the minimum capital ratio and the common equity
floor are  = 10% and  = 5%. Given these volatilities and the market risk premium, the
present values of the two projects are  10 = 1086 and  20 = 1062. The simulated results for
the optimal  () are shown in Fig 7. The graph of the results are plotted in Fig 8.
The simulated results suggest the following,
• For low leverage, the risk chosen approaches the first-best.
• For higher leverage, the shareholders choose the risks in the ascending order of expro-
priation, government bail-out, equity-conversion CoCo bond bail-in and write-oﬀ CoCo
bond bail-in.
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F First‐best Expropriat
ion
Bail‐out
Equity‐
conversion 
CoCo
Write‐off 
CoCo
30 19.36% 19.36% 19.36% 19.36% 19.36%
35 19.36% 19.36% 19.36% 19.36% 19.36%
40 19.36% 19.36% 19.36% 19.36% 19.36%
45 19.36% 19.36% 19.36% 19.36% 19.36%
50 19.36% 19.36% 19.36% 19.36% 19.36%
55 19.36% 19.36% 19.36% 19.37% 19.37%
60 19.36% 19.37% 19.39% 19.40% 19.43%
65 19.36% 19.40% 19.47% 19.49% 19.57%
70 19.36% 19.50% 19.68% 19.74% 19.93%
75 19.36% 19.75% 20.20% 20.34% 20.73%
80 19.36% 20.34% 21.56% 21.86% 22.49%
85 19.36% 21.81% 26.02% 26.12% 26.30%
90 19.36% 26.45% 36.00% 33.63% 32.41%
95 19.36% 36.00% 44.03% 39.95% 38.34%
Figure 7: Simulated results for equityholders’ risk choice for diﬀerent leverage
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Figure 8: Shareholders’ chosen risk for diﬀerent leverage
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• For very high leverage, the bail-out structure induces the highest risk-taking, with lower
risk-taking for the write-oﬀ structure.
The explanations for the last point are as follows. For the bail-out, in our analysis the
shareholders are guaranteed to the common equity floor  of the restored balance sheet level

1− , while in the bail-in cases their guarantee is at the trigger level  of the depleted balance
sheet  . For example when  = 5%, 1− = 100 and  = 7%, under the government bail-out
the shareholders are never worse oﬀ than 1− = 5, while under the bail-in structures their
position  can be as low as 0 (see Fig 27 in Appendix C). This gives the shareholders
incentive for higher risk-taking under government bail-out in high-leverage cases. For the
write-oﬀ CoCo bail-in case, the jump up in the payoﬀ for the shareholders at the strike price

1− due to the binary put (as shown in Fig 27), implies that close to the strike price, the
shareholders would not prefer high volatility which would reduce the probability of ending up
with a high payoﬀ (i.e. within the triangle area in Fig 27). This reduces the incentive for high
risk-taking in high-leverage cases for the write-oﬀ bail-in structure.
Here it is also assumed that the government bail-out takes the form of ordinary shares
capital injection (see again Hori and Martin Ceron (2015)). Another possibility would be for
the capital injection to be in the form of preference shares. As modelled, these two bail-out
structures would have the same payoﬀs for the shareholders at the maturity  . In reality
though the two would result in diﬀerent behaviours by the shareholders. Specifically, the lack
of dilution and the higher expected ROE would mean that the shareholders are more likely to
take higher risks with the preference shares bail-out.
2.5 Monitoring Cost
The inevitable agency costs of bail-in should encourage bondholders to monitor shareholders’
behaviour. This results in monitoring costs to the bondholders. For example, a passive asset
manager who has been investing in financial bonds for its index tracking portfolio now needs
fundamental analysts to monitor the credit quality of the banks. This is costly. Jensen and
Meckling (1976) argue that these monitoring costs are ultimately borne by shareholders via
higher cost of capital (WACC) demanded. The threat of the fall in the bank’s value should
in turn curb the bank’s risk-taking behaviour and discipline shareholders. In this section we
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Figure 9: Eﬀect of Monitoring Cost on Shareholders’ Choice of Risk
demonstrate this mechanism using the model developed above.
The rise in the return demanded by the investors, due to the monitoring costs, is here
represented by an increase in the price of risk for the higher risk project 1 from 1 to 01. This
is the higher WACC of choosing a higher proportion of the riskier project. As a result, the
present value of the project plans are reduced for the riskier choices. This is depicted in Fig
9 by the “squeezing” of the project plans frontier. In again selecting the tangent point with
their ICs (here with equity-conversion CoCo bond bail-in), the shareholders’ optimal choice of
project plan is now of a lower risk.
In policy terms this is analogous to Pigovian tax. The agency costs are the negative ex-
ternality of shareholders’ actions on the remaining stakeholders of the bank. By implementing
higher costs on their action, the regulators can force the shareholders to select less risky choice.
As a demonstration, Fig 10 simulates the resulting behaviour of the shareholders with varying
degrees of increase in 1, when  = 80. It shows that with suﬃcient rise in the cost of choos-
ing the riskier project, the shareholders can be made to choose the first-best risk level for all
structures. There is, however, a social cost of the value of firm being lowered as a result, as
shown in Fig 9.
More formally,
Proposition 7 The higher the required rate of return of the riskier project 1, the lower the
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shareholders’ choice of risk.
Proof. To show this, consider two downward-sloping curves as a function of a variable ,
 (;) and  ().  is an exogenous parameter. Let the derivatives of the functions be such
that   0,   0,   ,   0 and   0. This implies that, (i)  (;) is strictly
concave in ; (ii)  () is less concave than  () and can even be linear or convex; and (iii)
 (;) becomes steeper (more downward-sloping) with an increase in . Let now ∗ be the
value of  where the two curves are tangent, i.e.  (∗;) =  (). Then as  increases,

 (
∗;) = 
∗
 + . (44)
For the two curves to be tangent again, this must equal  (∗) =  ∗ . Thus,
∗
 =

 −   0. (45)
This is negative from the conditions on the derivatives. Our tangency analysis between the
concave project plan curves ( (;)) and the quasi-concave ICs ( ()) satisfy these conditions,
where  =  and  = 1. Hence the choice of  decreases with higher 1.
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Moreover, the size of this eﬀect depends on how far the bank’s balance sheet is from the
restructuring point (the minimum capital ratio  for the government bail-out case and the
trigger level  for the CoCo bond bail-in cases),
Proposition 8 The shareholders react more to the rise in the riskier project’s required rate of
return, the further away the bank is from the restructuring point.
Proof. We have seen in Properties 1 that the ICs are concave when 0 is far above the
restructuring point but turns convex closer to it. This means that  turns from negative to
positive as 0 falls towards the restructuring point, implying decreasing ∗ .
Given these results, we can now propose financial and non-financial covenants as the best
way to articulate the monitoring eﬀort.
3 Covenants
We have established above that the agency costs can, to a certain extent, be mitigated by
rising required rate of return when riskier project plan is chosen. In practice this equates to
the bondholders demanding higher cost of debt to compensate for their monitoring cost. In
this section we propose covenants within the CoCo indentures to implement this idea.
Covenants are regularly inserted in corporate bonds (especially from high yield issuers)
to monitor more eﬀectively the investment and financial policies of the company. Corporate
covenants have successfully attenuated investment distortions and risk-taking incentives in
the corporate bond market through higher monitoring and bond costs, reducing agency costs
between shareholders and bondholders (see for example, Gamba and Triantis (2014)10). In
a similar manner we propose covenants in the CoCo indentures to promote financial and
investment discipline in banks to curb risk-taking appetite.
We suggest financial accounting covenants with a “ratchet coupon” system whereby the
CoCo bond coupon rate gradually increases as the fundamentals of the bank debilitate and
the covenants are breached. The ratchet system is suggested as the empirical literature on
10They show how eﬀective debt covenant restrictions can shift shareholders’ financing and investments towards
value maximisation.
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corporate bond covenants (e.g. Bradley and Roberts (2004), Gamba and Triantis (2014))
tend to indicate that the conventional covenants are usually fixed at relatively low levels and
fail to exert the necessary financial discipline on the company. Introducing a ratchet with
diﬀerent covenant levels enables the bondholders to monitor and control the bank’s risk-taking
more eﬀectively. With the rising risk-taking bondholders are compensated through a coupon
increase that mirrors the increasing risk premium. Similarly through a comprehensive covenant
ratchet that maps the financial ratio with diﬀerent coupon levels, the regulator can prevent
shareholders from taking actions that would further extract wealth from bondholders as the
solvency ratios heads towards the CoCo trigger or the PONV. The covenant will exert discipline
on managers and shareholders due to onerous coupon increases which will automatically dent
shareholders’ returns. Our result in Proposition 8 suggests that this type of covenant based-
discipline is more eﬀective during times of stable solvency, away from the point of restructuring.
Later, for covenants close to restructuring point we suggest diﬀerent kind of covenants, namely
asset sweep and debt sweep covenants.
3.1 Ratchet Coupon Financial Accounting Covenants
Following empirical evidence (for example Bradley and Roberts (2004), Billet, King and Mauer
(2007), Chava and Roberts (2008), Roberts and Sufi (2009), Gamba and Triantis (2014)) of
covenants on corporate bonds, we suggest three candidates for the index for the ratchet trigger
in our proposed financial accounting covenants:
• Fully loaded Core Tier 1 Ratio: 1
• Leverage Ratio: +1 , where AT1 is the Tier 1 CoCo
• Interest Coverage / ADI11 interest coverage:   
Financial accounting covenants are suggested as it is diﬃcult to use income statement based
covenants due to the ongoing presence of exceptional and one-oﬀ items in the banks’ profit
and loss account. The choice of the CT1 ratio would be a natural one, as both the CoCo
11Maximum Amount of Distributable Items linked to the holding company or the distance to coupon suspen-
sion on the Combined Buﬀer (minimum CT1 including all additional buﬀers).
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trigger and the coupon payments are then linked to the Core Tier 1 of the bank, allowing
bondholders to evaluate the degree of headroom versus CoCo trigger and coupon suspension
(on AT1s). The leverage ratio covenant would allow bondholders to monitor bank’s indebtness
to restrict balance sheet expansion and constrain managers to constantly pursue shareholders
friendly investments.12 The interest coverage covenant (to monitor the buﬀer on AT1s coupon
payments) is a common covenant in corporate bonds to assess the ability of the company
to service the coupons. These covenants would have to be calibrated to suit the nuances of
each CoCo bond class. Specifically, CoCo T2s have a specific maturity and mandatory coupon
payments, and hence the introduction of covenants and ratchets would be easier as these bonds
are similar to unsecured corporate bonds. On the other hand CoCo AT1s are perpetual and
their coupons payments are not mandatory,13 and so imposing a ratchet covenant structure on
these may be more challenging.14
We now describe the covenant’s mechanism with a simple model using the leverage ratio.
The value of the asset  at period  ∈ {0 1} is the sum of the equity , the plain vanilla
bond  and the T2 CoCo bond ,
 =  + + . (46)
The leverage ratio  at period  is then,15
 =  . (47)
The costs of debt of the plain vanilla bond and the CoCo bond are  and  , respectively.
The return on equity of the asset is   0. Then at the end of the period 0 the firm produces
12For example the sovereign bond “carry trade”, as sovereign bonds are zero risk weighted asset.
13AT1 CoCo bond coupons can be partially or totally suspended if there is not enough Distributable Amounts
within the equity (set by the MDA - Maximum Distributable Amount) or if the Combined Buﬀer (made up of
the Countercyclical, Conservation and Systemic equity buﬀers) is breached.
14Moreover, if the capital ratios fall below the Basel III combined buﬀer (the buﬀer above the minimum
capital ratio), the coupon payments can be reduced or even suspended. Furthermore, the indenture does not
contemplate any dividend stopper (CoCo bond coupons can be suspended whilst dividends are paid out) or
pushers (dividends payments can be resumed whilst CoCo bond coupons can still be missed).
15The Basel III leverage ratio allows for the AT1 CoCo bond (eﬀectively a deeply perpetual subordinated
Tier 1 bond) to be included.
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the EBIT of 0. Assuming zero tax rate the bank’s net income is then,
0 = 0 − 0 − 0. (48)
The bank’s return on equity (ROE) is,
 = 00 . (49)
We assume that this net income is added to capital in whole as retained earnings. The period
1 asset and the leverage are then given by (46) and (47) above with 1 = 0, 1 = 0 and
1 = 0 + 0 and 1 = 0 + 0. (50)
This implies an increasing leverage ratio 1 = 11  00 = 0 for a profit-making bank with
0  0, as 0+00+0  00 ⇔ 00 + 00  00 + 00 ⇔ 0  0.
Consider now a new risky investment 0 at period 0 with an uncertain return  . The
investment is funded by an increase in the plain vanilla bond issuance, 0 = 00 − 0. The
funding cost is assumed unaﬀected at  despite the decrease in the leverage ratio to,
00 = 000 =
0
0 +  . (51)
The leverage ratio in period 1 is now,
01 = 0 + 0 + ( − ) 0 +  + 0 + ( − )  =
1 + ( − ) 
1 +  + ( − )  . (52)
The covenant specifies the ratchet trigger leverage ratios and the corresponding CoCo bond
coupon levels
©  ª,  = 1 2 , with 0  1  2   and   1  2   . Consider
the first trigger level 1. This is breached when 01  1, or
   − 1 − (1 + ) 
1
(1− 1)  = 
1 , (53)
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where  is the realised rate of return of the risky investment corresponding to the ratchet
trigger rate  . Note where the right-hand side is positive this implies that the ratchet would
be triggered even when the risky investment returns a positive rate. Similarly the second
ratchet is triggered when,
   − 1 −
¡1 − ¢0 − £1 +  − ¡1 − ¢0¤ 2
(1− 2)  . (54)
The shareholders’ realised ROE also depends on the ratchet trigger,
0 =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
 + ( − ) 0 , if 1  
 + ( − ) 0 −
¡1 − ¢ 00 , if 2   ≤ 1
 + ( − ) 0 −
¡2 − ¢ 00 , if 3   ≤ 2
...
...
. (55)
Fig 11 depicts the eﬀect of the ratchet coupon covenant on the shareholders’ return. This
financial accounting covenant then encourages lower risk-taking through two channels. Firstly,
the step-down nature of the ROE as  falls introduces concavity in the return profile of the
shareholders. In much the same way as the convexity in the shareholders’ payoﬀ at bail-out
/ bail-in trigger points creates incentive for higher risk-taking (due to a long vega position),
the concavity at the ratchet trigger points (i.e. a short vega position) discourages risk-taking.
Secondly, once the ratchet is triggered the higher CoCo coupon means higher cost of debt for
the bank, which leads to lower risk-taking being chosen as the shareholders’ optimal choice as
discussed in Proposition 7.
However, both of these two channels become less eﬀective as the bank’s balance sheet
nears the PONV or the CoCo trigger. For the first channel this is because the concavity at
the ratchet triggers are oﬀset by the convexity at the CoCo trigger. For the second channel,
we already saw in Proposition 8 that the convexity of the shareholders’ indiﬀerence curve
near the CoCo trigger point reduced its eﬀectiveness. Intuitively, the appeal of “gamble-for-
resurrection” or “looting” more than oﬀsets the eﬀectiveness of these covenants. We therefore
suggest introducing these financial accounting covenants at the inception of CoCo bonds when,
by assumption, the solvency ratios of the bank are healthy.
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Figure 11:  vs  with Ratchet Coupon Covenant
3.2 Asset Sweep / Debt Sweep Covenants
In a falling solvency scenario where risk-taking and “gamble-for-resurrection” incentives are
high (as demonstrated by Hori and Martin Ceron (2014)), we instead propose the following
types of covenants:
• Asset Sweep Covenant
• Debt Sweep Covenant
Asset sweeps are common in private debt placements (see, for example, Bradley and Roberts
(2004)). Once triggered, the bank is forced to sell assets to pay down debt, and thus increasing
the leverage ratio. This prevents shareholders from liquidating assets to receive a large dividend
(i.e. “looting”) or take on new debt in order to finance a risky investment (“gamble-for-
resurrection”), reducing the agency cost of bail-in near the CoCo trigger point / PONV.16
Let now  be the proportion of the asset that has to be divested, post-risky investment
01. We assume that the whole of this is used to pay down the debt, in which case the debt is
16This type of covenant could dissuade shareholders from pursuing asset divestitures, as the proceeds will
accrue to bondholders. However, if the market price of the CoCo has fallen to a level where a buy back could
lead to a capital gain (we suspect the price of the CoCo could drop by 30%-50% if these covenants are triggered),
then shareholders will benefit from a lower leverage ratio, via lower assets (less debt) and higher equity (capital
gain).
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reduced to 01 − 01.17 The bank will seek to sell those assets in which it can materialise a
capital gain, i.e.   1 where  is the ratio of the asset’s market value and its nominal value.
The profit from this divestiture is therefore (− 1)01, which is added to the bank’s capital
as retained earnings. As a result the equity is increased to 01 + (− 1)01, while the final
value of the asset is (1− )01+(− 1)01 = 01+(− 2)01. Therefore the bank’s leverage
ratio becomes,
01 = 
0
1 + (− 1)01
[1 + (− 2)]01 . (56)
When   2 this is clearly less than 0101 , where the leverage ratio is bolstered by both a lower
denominator (asset) and a higher numerator (equity).18 The trigger level 
0
101 and the divestiture
ratio  are designed such that the leverage ratio is likely to be restored to a minimum level
required by the regulator, though this will clearly depend on the capital gain ratio . However in
the case that the asset sale fails to restore the leverage ratio to the required level, the regulator
can impose further non-core asset sales and dividend / CoCo bond payouts19 cancellations to
bolster solvency and reinstate the leverage ratio back to the compulsory level.
The debt sweep covenant20 resembles the asset sweep covenant, but the proceeds from newly
issued debt is used to repay existing debt when the leverage ratio has fallen below the last
ratchet (or any other financial covenant) trigger level. This sets a floor in the bank’s leverage
ratio, curbing shareholders’ appetite for leveraging up as the bank’s solvency deteriorates.
We believe through a combination of these three types of covenants the agency costs can be
contained. Financial covenants are useful to keep risk and leverage appetite down (especially
in a low profitability environment) from the bond inception, enabling bondholders to monitor
the banks and incorporate the increasing risk premium in the market price of the bonds as soon
as the risk profile of the bank creeps up. We have proposed a ratchet coupon structure which
17Going forward all unsecured debt will be loss absorbing (including senior) but the regulator is targeting a
minimum loss absorbing capacity (TLAC). Since the regulator would never allow a CoCo to be repaid nor any
loss absorbing debt that makes up the TLAC, we argue that the asset sweep should work for any non-TLAC
debt (both secured and unsecured).
1801 is increased for all values of   1 as 01+(−1)01[1+(−2)]01 
0101 ⇔ 
0
101 + (− 1) (01)2 
[1 + (− 2)]0101 ⇔ (− 1)01  (− 2)01, which is true as − 1  − 2 and 01  01.
19The bond indenture should contemplate this event, especially in AT1 CoCo bonds.
20This covenant could be intertwined with the financial covenant ratios to oﬀset the increasing appetite for
leverage.
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we believe is an eﬀective way of doing this. Both asset and debt sweep covenants contribute to
the diminishing of the appetite for debt when risky investment opportunities become appealing
for the bank, as they alleviate the incentives of the banks to issue new debt to extract wealth
from existing bondholders. These two covenants should be triggered when the solvency ratios
are decreasing (but still high enough21) and financial covenants are no longer eﬀective near the
PONV or the CoCo trigger point.
4 Cost of Capital
In this section we investigate the impact of the new regulatory capital measures, namely bail-in
and CoCo bonds, on the cost of capital (WACC) of the banks. So far, we have argued that
in order to counter the agency costs of wealth transfer and value destruction, bondholders,
facing going concern losses, need to continuously monitor the risk appetite of the bank. This
is not free; for instance a traditional passive fund will now have to hire a team of analysts to
monitor their financial bonds. Similarly, the use of covenants we advocated in Section 3 also
comes with a cost, as bondholders are now required to monitor the status of the covenants
and the banks’ fundamentals (as is typical of the high yield corporate bond market). These
additional costs borne by the bondholders are passed on to the shareholders via higher cost
of debt. For the current market, we believe that the prices of the existing CoCo and Senior
bonds do not reflect this monitoring cost, especially for banks where senior bonds qualify for
the total loss absorbing capacity (TLAC) of the banks. The low yielding environment and the
financial repression has allowed banks to place these bonds at very low rate levels which also
do not incorporate the increasing agency costs of bail-in. This will change over time as yields
rise and bondholders come to grips with the reality of bail-in and the DAPR.
Banks’ WACC are aﬀected by the new regulatory framework that requires higher equity and
loss absorbing debt. Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig and Pfleiderer (2011) argue that higher equity
requirements would lower both the cost of equity and the cost of debt, and therefore despite the
change in the funding mix (more equity which has the higher cost), the WACC should remain
unchanged. In contrast we believe that the WACC would meaningfully rise. To demonstrate
21We suggest, for example, 9% CT1. In the upcoming paper we foresee the regulator (and the market)
imposing a 115% minimum CT1 for Global Systemic banks.
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this, we now estimate the pre- and post-Basel III WACC for the 16 largest European banks
using the September 2014 quarterly reports and the market data as of beginning of October
2014. Later, a sensitivity analysis is then undertaken to test the impact that our assumptions
on the main variables have on the WACC to derive a range of possible WACC estimates.
4.1 Pre-Basel III WACC
We estimate the pre-Basel III WACC by estimating its components, the COE and the COD.
The COE is estimated by the CAPM using,22
• Risk free rate - 10 year sovereign bond yield of the country where the bank has its main
operations;23
•  - 2 year adjusted  for each bank; and
• Equity risk premium - the embedded ERP in the equity market of the bank where it has
its main operations.24
The most critical factor here is the . The  of a bank is driven by three factors: operating
leverage (=fixed coststotal costs ), financial leverage (=
debt
equity ) and earnings volatility (= volatility of ROE),
with the financial leverage being the most relevant. The table in Fig 12 shows these main
drivers for diﬀerent banks.25 All three factors are shown to be high at this point, especially the
operating and financial leverages. The operating leverage should drop in the volatile investment
banking business of banks due to the onerous capital charges stemming from Basel III (indeed
many banks are scaling down or even dismantling their investment banking operations, such as
22As our sample of banks comprises big banks, we exclude any risk premium for small size or idiosyncratic risk
for the bank. Despite the main limitations of CAPM, including homogeneous expectations and no transaction
costs, we still believe that the model is useful for a good “proxy” of the cost of capital of banks.
23The correlation between sovereign and financial bond yields are still very high, and thus financial bond
spreads still incorporate the sovereign bond premium.
24There are many approaches to calculate ERP (e.g. Damodaran (2013), Graham and Dodd (2011)). We
follow a Gordon discount dividend model (DDM), accounting for share repurchases, using Bloomberg market
consensus expected dividends payouts for the stock exchange of the bank. DDM models perform better in
predicting future equity returns than Residual Income Models. It is also forward-looking rather than based on
historical data.
25The last column “Type of Business” is the proportion of retail business within the banks’ global earnings
and represents the earnings volatility - the higher the retail business (as opposed to wholesale or investment
banking), the lower the earnings volatility.
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Figure 12: Pre-Basel III  determinants, October 2014. Source: Bloomberg and author
RBS). On the other hand it should not meaningfully fall in the retail banking business which
is characterised by a high fixed cost base (oﬃces, NPL related provisions, etc). Therefore we
will see later that even if the financial leverage decreases post-new financial regulation, there
are some intrinsic features of the banking industry that makes the  of the banks higher than
the market average of one. Applying these to the CAPM we derive the current estimates of
COE in Fig 13. The average is shown as 13%.
The pre-Basel III COD is estimated using the average interest spread of the banks’ liabilities
(such as deposits, covered, senior, subordinate bonds, etc.), shown in Fig 14. The average pre-
tax COD is computed to be 21%.
Finally the pre-tax WACC is estimated in Fig 15, which shows the current average of 27%
for the 16 European banks.
Note that the COE can also be derived as the market implied COE from the current share
price, using the market consensus 2016 ROE (taken from Bloomberg) and a terminal growth
rate of 15%. The table in Fig 16 shows both the CAPM COE derived above and the market
implied COE. The latter is lower than the former due to technical reasons (abundant liquidity,
central bank interventions, Quantitative Easing, etc.) The table shows that the banks’ ROE
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Figure 13: Pre-Basel III COE, October 2014. Source: Bloomberg and author
Figure 14: Pre-Basel III Pre-tax COD, September 2014. Source: Banks’ quarterly reports
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Figure 15: Pre-Basel III Pre-tax WACC, Sep-Oct 2014. Source: Banks’ quarterly reports and
author
will struggle to cover their COE in the current environment.26
4.2 Post-Basel III WACC Estimation
We now compute the post-Basel III estimates of the cost of debt using Basel III and bail-in
guidelines. The analysis is based on some assumptions regarding the future solvency rules for
banks. At the end of this section we run some sensitivity test on the main assumptions to
determine a potential WACC range for our sample of banks.
We start with the estimated Basel III RWA for the banks based on their last quarterly
update. There is only a 7% increase versus the phase-in Basel III RWA,27 highlighting the
banks’ potential leeway to continue their deleveraging strategy to boost solvency ratios. First
26The ROE should remain subdued due to reasons such as capital bolstering (deleveraging), onerous capital
charges on traditional high ROE businesses (derivatives, oﬀ balance sheet businesses), low interest rates and
operating leverage (income is decreasing whereas fixed costs remain stubbornly stable).
27The phase-in Basel III is the current Basel III RWA or CT1 without making all the adjustments of the
fully-loaded Basel III figure. Bansk are currently reporting this number to show investors how they are building
their solvency towards achieving the fully-loaded Basel III CT1.
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Figure 16: Pre-Basel III COE, October 2014. Source: Author
we estimate the existing amount of AT1 (Tier 1 CoCo) and T2 (Tier 2) CoCo bonds, as well
the average T1 (Tier 1) and T2 coupon, and we convert them to the base currency of the
bank. We note that while some banks have not issued CoCo bonds yet, they can still issue up
to 15% RWA of T1s and 2% RWA of T2s that will count towards the total capital ratio.28
The total regulatory capital available for loss absorption is then derived by summing up the
amount of equity, T1 CoCo bonds and T2 CoCo bonds. To simplify the analysis, we assume
that all current plain vanilla T1 and T2 bonds will be called or replaced by CoCo bonds over
time.29 Then on the assumption that the banks have to achieve a TLAC of 23%− 25% RWA
(or 10% liabilities), we compute the current capital deficit. The banks have four options to
28We estimate the total capital ratio for systemic banks at 15%−16% RWA versus a TLAC close to 23%−25%
RWA (or 10% liabilities).
29Many of these bonds are either non-Basel III compliant (they have a step-up after the call or incentives
to redeem) or they will be amortised through the next ten years and thus they will lose regulatory capital
eligibility over time. They still count as regulatory capital, but we believe that those eligible for amortisation
will be gradually replaced or called as they become obsolete and illiquid (already the bid-ask spreads of these
bonds are in excess of three to four points). This move will be further fuelled by the fact that owning CoCo
bonds rather than traditional T1 bonds will become a sign of franchise strength and sophistication as the CoCo
bond sector thrives.
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plug the deficits, incurring a cost funding premium:
• Equity: this will be the most expensive funding source given the high COE in a falling
ROE environment.
• CoCo bonds: it will be an expensive source as these bonds come with high triggers and
contractual loss absorbing capacity and hence higher coupons.
• Plain vanilla T2 bonds: a cheaper option at the moment, but we believe that the funding
cost of these instruments will rise from the current levels, especially if used as bail-in-able
debt to comply with the TLAC.30
• Senior bonds: this will be the cheapest option, but the cost of funding will obviously
increase significantly as it potentially undermines the status of the senior bond market
as a funding market (becoming a regulatory capital market).31
For the sake of our analysis, we here assume that our sample banks choose the senior
bonds, due to the ongoing issuance of CoCo bonds, equities or the likes becoming financially
unviable. With the senior bonds becoming bail-in-able from 2016, we use a standard 25
premium (equivalent to a reasonable monitoring cost) above the existing five year senior CDS
for the banks.32 We use then an additional premium in excess of this 25 that ranges between
10−50 according to the magnitude of the capital deficit, reflecting the fact that banks with
a bigger capital deficit will be required to pay higher yield to issue senior debt to comply with
the TLAC. To estimate the future cost of the CoCo bonds to achieve the 15% RWA and 2%
RWA for T1 and T2 CoCo bonds respectively, we use the current average coupons to estimate
the reasonable premium to capture the agency cost of bail-in for CoCo bonds.33 Using 200
for T1, subtracting 150 (the current average spread diﬀerence between T1 and T2 CoCo
30French banks are now issuing plain vanilla T2 to boost the loss absorbing capacity of the bank.
31Note a senior bondholder is eﬀectively holding a CoCo bond going forward (any unsecured bond is now a
loss absorbing going concern liability). In any case senior bonds will become bail-in-able from 2016. This market
would most likely develop into one where issuers diﬀerentiate between TLAC senior bonds and non-TLAC senior
bonds.
32JP Morgan in their last investor survey (2013) on senior bail-in shows that investors expect between 75−
100 additional compensation for holding a bail-in-able senior bond.
33Our estimated T1 CoCo bond coupon is close to our estimated future pre-tax COE, which in our view is
where T1 CoCo bonds yield should trade at.
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bonds) from this yields the T2 CoCo bond coupon. For those banks which have not issued
CoCo bonds so far, we extrapolate the future CoCo bond coupon using a fundamental-bottom
up approach.34 The total bail-in-able funding cost is then computed using the future cost for
the CoCo bonds and the regulatory senior debt. This is shown in Fig 17.
To calculate the post-Basel III estimates of COD we use the five year normalised risk-free
asset yield which is derived from the ten year normalised risk-free asset yield based on the
futures options market, taken from Bloomberg (Fig 18). The computed post-Basel III pre-tax
COD is shown in Fig 19 as to have more than doubled to 44% on the back of the new bail-in
rules.
To estimate the post-Basel III COE, we use again the CAPM. First, the banks’  are
estimated from the adjusted two year Bloomberg  and conducting an unlevering / relevering
exercise.35 TA/TE in Fig 20 stands for the ratio of tangible assets to tangible equity and it is
the measure of the banks’ financial leverage. As shown, on average the sample is levered by
22 times with the average  of 121. We unlever this  and relever it using a 12 times TA/TE.
This bodes well with a 7 times Basel III leverage ratio36 which is the regulator’s guidance for
Systematically Important Banks. This yields a  of 088, below the market  of one.37 Using
the normalised ten year risk-free asset and the same ERP as previously, we derive the average
post-Basel III COE to be 106% (Fig 21). Note that given the 2016 ROE Bloomberg consensus,
this implies that banks are still unable to cover their COE for the foreseeable future (Fig 22).
Finally to estimate the post-Basel III WACC, we require the estimates for the future
funding mix weighting between equity and debt. For this we assume that the minimum Basel
III leverage ratio38 will be set at 7%, so in taking the current leverage ratio for each bank and
stripping out the T1 CoCo bonds, we can compute the necessary equity levels to fulfill this
34For example, HSBC and Standard should have similar CoCo bond coupons given their similar fundamentals.
Similarly for BNP and UBS.
35Here Harris-Pringle formula is used.
36  + 1 

37 It is conservative to assume the banks’  of below one. The financial industry, due to its lending and
maturity transformation role in the real economy, are characterised by higher leverage and lower equity than
the corporate industry. Though Basel III aims to reduce the amount of leverage and increase equity, banks
would always run a higher degree of leverage than corporates. Further, banks will still remain as a volatile
undertaking owing to NPLs (making them very much pro-cyclical), trading income / losses as well as potential
operational or financial risks (such as fraud, scandals and short selling bans).
38  + 1 

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Figure 17: Post-Basel III COD. Source: author
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Figure 18: Normalised Risk-free Asset. Source: Bloomberg and author
Figure 19: Post-Basel III Pre-tax COD Estimates. Source: Banks’ quarterly reports and
author
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Figure 20: Post-Basel III  Estimates. Source: Bloomberg and author
Figure 21: Post-Basel III COE Estimates. Source: Bloomberg and author
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Figure 22: Post Basel III ROE − COE. Source: Bloomberg and author
leverage ratio (Fig 23). With the estimated COE, COD and the equity weighting, we finally
arrive at the post-Basel III pre-tax WACC estimates shown in Fig 24. The average WACC is
estimated to be 48%, or 85% higher than the current level.
4.3 Robustness Analysis
Due to the sensitivity of the analysis to the multiples variables and assumptions, we run some
tests on the WACC by setting diﬀerent values for our main assumptions on senior bail-in
premium, agency cost of bail-in for CoCo bonds, Basel TA/TE and Basel III leverage ratio.
The potential value range for the post-Basel III WACC for our sample banks are shown in
Figures 25 and 26. As can be observed in the tables, the range of WACC estimates is given as
between 454% to 522%, equating to a 75% to 110% increase on the current WACC.
To conclude, we have shown here that in even using conservative assumptions, we foresee
the WACC of banks rising meaningfully on the back of the new Basel III rules (contractual
bail-in, i.e. the CoCo bonds, and statutory bail-in, i.e. the senior debt bail-in) with potentially
negative ramifications to the real economy. We believe the cost of equity could drop from the
existing levels via lower  (though it is diﬃcult to see the long term  below one) and lower
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Figure 23: Equity Required for Minimum Basel III Leverage Ratio. Source: author
Figure 24: Post-Basel III Pre-tax WACC Estimates. Source: Bloomberg and author
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Figure 25: Post-Basel III WACC Estimates for Diﬀerent Values of Senior Bail-in Premium and
Basel III TA./TE. Source: author
Figure 26: Post-Basel III WACC Estimates for Diﬀerent Values of CoCo Agency Cost of Bail-in
and Basel III Leverage Ratio. Source: author
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equity risk premium, but this is more than oﬀset by the higher cost of debt driven by the
monitoring cost of the agency costs of bail-in, resulting in higher WACCs.
5 Conclusions
We believe bail-in will prove not to solve the moral hazard problem that is the short-fall of
bail-out schemes. Moreover, it incorporates an additional problem which is the lurking agency
costs that lie behind the new relationship between shareholders and bondholders. The DAPR
brought about by bail-in will change the profile of the trade-oﬀ between value and risk for
shareholders. The relationship between risk and value becomes less concave and eventually
convex as the solvency “flirts” with PONV, and shareholders can boost the riskiness of the
assets without sacrificing too much of the value of the bank (in technical term the ratio of
vega to delta decreases, and hence more volatility can be traded for less value). This is more
acute with write-oﬀ CoCo bond bail-in than with equity-conversion CoCo, but, under both
structures, the high risk-taking appetite of shareholders are higher relative to the traditional
bail-out (let alone full equity expropriation) as demonstrated in this paper. As a result we
believe that bondholders’ monitoring costs would rise, as they will not passively wait to be
reimbursed while the DAPR induced agency costs lurk under the surface.
We also believe that covenants in CoCo bonds proposed in this paper are an eﬀective way
to curb risk-taking. When solvency is high, contractual covenants will swiftly incorporate
the additional risk premium via upward coupon resetting that exerts discipline on banks and
dents shareholder returns. The shareholders are not able to trade easily the bank value oﬀ
against volatility for two reasons: the concave nature of the shareholders’ return on equity
at each ratchet trigger point, and the higher cost of capital once triggered. As solvency
deteriorates towards the CoCo trigger or the PONV these become less eﬀective as, as well as
the fact that higher coupons erode solvency even more, the shareholders’ incentive to “gamble-
for-resurrection” negate the above eﬀects. Thus at this point, when CoCo bonds trade at
distress, the monitoring eﬀort becomes no longer fruitful. In these cases we propose a diﬀerent
type of covenants, namely asset and debt sweeps. Further investigations of other solutions to
alleviating moral hazard and agency costs, especially near the PONV / CoCo trigger point,
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are left to future research.
Lastly, we also believe that the cost of capital for banks is poised to rise on the back of the
required monitoring costs and the peculiarities of the bail-in framework. The former arises as
the traditional banks’ debt investors, such as mutual funds, insurers, long only funds etc., will
be forced to strengthen their research capabilities (more fundamental analysts) as they will
be exposed to going concern losses. Moreover, in reality any unsecured debts are eﬀectively
contingent convertible via regulatory powers, and hence passive or indexed funds will not be
able to buy and hold a bank bond expecting to be fully repaid or bailed-out. They will also
need to monitor the fundamentals of the banks and the costs of which will in the end be borne
by the shareholders via higher risk premium. As far as the latter are concerned, we foresee
both subordinate and senior debt coupon rising as investors factor in the agency cost and the
change in payout of their embedded option (debt in the upside, equity or full write-oﬀ in the
downside). The compulsory solvency and leverage ratios, including the TLAC (RWA), will
force the banks to issue more CoCo bonds or unsecured debts which will increase the overall
cost of debt. Moreover, as soon as interest rates normalise from the current historical lows and
investors’ appetite for these high yielding bonds attenuate in a rising yielding environment, we
envisage CoCo bonds (and to a lesser extent other unsecured debt) coupons moving closer to
the pre-tax cost of equity.39 Even if one assumes, as we do, a lower cost of equity on the back
of a decreasing 40 (via lower financial leverage and earning volatility), this will not keep the
WACC from rising. This trend, coupled with decreasing ROE (as a result of higher equity,
lower leverage, less ROE intensive businesses etc.) should put a “dent” in banks’ share prices.
This may even accentuate shareholders’ risk appetite. Such possible impacts of higher WACC
on the real economy are a topic for future research.
39Specially AT1 CoCo bonds that do not have the equity upside (a fixed income instrument) but have the
equity downside (coupons can be suspended and their capital impaired on a going concern basis).
40Our unlevering and relevering  analysis shows the  of some banks falling below one. This is still a very
optimistic outcome as we believe the  of the banks in general, due to the intrinsic operating / financial leverage
and earnings volatility, should warrant a  above one. This should render a higher COE and thus a higher
WACC under our framework.
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6 Appendix
A Properties of  ()
 () is the cumulative distribution function for a standard normally distributed random
variable  ∼  (0 1) such that  () = Pr ( ≤ ). Then  0 () is the probability density
function  0 () = 1√
2−
2
2 .
Property A1
lim→∞ 
0()
() = 0
lim→−∞ 
0()
() = −.
(57)
Proof. The first limit is trivial as lim→∞ 0 () = 0 and lim→∞ () = 1. For the second,
note first that lim→−∞ 0 () = 0 and lim→−∞ () = 0. The limit can therefore be found
using L’Hôpital’s rule,
lim→−∞
 0 ()
 () = lim→−∞
 00 ()
 0 () = lim→−∞
− 0 ()
 0 () = −. (58)
Property A2


µ 0 ()
 ()
¶
 0 ∀. (59)
Proof. Expanding,


µ 0 ()
 ()
¶
= −
0 ()
 () −
µ 0 ()
 ()
¶2
= −
0 ()
 ()
µ () + 0 ()
 ()
¶
. (60)
This is negative if and only if  () + 0 ()  0. This is obvious for  ≥ 0. For   0, first
check the limits,
lim→0  () + 0 () =  0 (0) = 1√2  0
lim→−∞  () + 0 () = lim→−∞ ()
³
+  0()()
´
= 0
(61)
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using Property A1. Now,


¡ () + 0 ()¢ =  () +  0 ()−  0 () =  ()  0 ∀ (62)
which proves that  () + 0 ()  0 ∀  0.
B Limiting Properties of Call and Put Options
Properties B1 (Properties at the limits of call and put option values)
1. For large ,
lim→∞ 1 =∞ ⇒ lim→∞ (1) = 1
lim→∞ 2 = −∞ ⇒ lim→∞ (2) = 0
⎫
⎬
⎭⇒
⎧
⎨
⎩
lim→∞ () = 0
lim→∞  () = −
 (63)
Therefore a call option behaves like the underlying asset while a put option behaves like
a bond.
2. For  → 0,
lim→0 1 = lim→0 2 =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
−∞ if 0  −
0 if 0 = −
∞ if 0  −
⇒ lim→0 (1) = lim→0 (2) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0
1
2
1
.
(64)
Thus,
lim→0 () = max £0 −−  0¤
lim→0  () = max £− − 0 0¤ . (65)
Intuitively the options approximate their intrinsic values.
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C Bond and shareholders’ Payoﬀs under Diﬀerent Restructur-
ing Scenarios
The derivations of the following payoﬀs and valuations are given in detail in Hori and Martin
Ceron (2015).
C.1 Expropriation (No Bail-out / Bail-in)
The payoﬀs at time  are,
 = max [ −  0]
 = min [   ] .
(66)
The values at  = 0 under the Merton (1974) framework are then given by,
  =  ( )
  = − −  ( )
(67)
where  () and  () are call and put option values with strike  given by (19) and (32),
respectively.
C.2 Government Bail-out
The bondholders are guaranteed their face value  at time  . Given the minimum capital
ratio , this means that the government will have to restore the balance sheet to 1− . With
the common equity floor of  , the shareholders are then guaranteed the minimum of 1− .
 = max
h
 −  1−
i
 =  .
(68)
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The values at  = 0 are given by,
  = 1− − + 
³
 + 1−
´
=  ( ) +
h

³
 + 1−
´
−  ( )
i
  = − .
(69)
C.3 Equity-conversion CoCo Bond Bail-in
Here we assume that, in the extreme case that the CoCo bond is not enough to cover the whole
of the loss, the plain vanilla bonds will also be forced to write-down the remaining loss. The
shareholders are then guaranteed the minimum of  at which point the CoCo conversion
is triggered. The bondholders will hold the remaining (1− ) in the forms of either plain
vanilla bond, CoCo-converted equity or unconverted CoCo bond.
 = max [ −   ]
 = min [ (1− ) ] .
(70)
The values at  = 0 are,
  = 0 + (1− )
³ 
1−
´
=  ( ) +
h
(1− )
³ 
1−
´
−  ( )
i
  =
£− −  ( )¤− h(1− ) ³ 1− ´−  ( )i .
(71)
C.4 Write-oﬀ CoCo Bond Bail-in
Write-oﬀ bonds are triggered in its entirety once the trigger level  is breached. Then,
 = max [ −   ]− ≥ 1−
 = min [ (1− ) ] + ≥ 1− .
(72)
where ≥ 1− is the indicator function,
≥ 1− =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 if  ≥ 1−
0 if   1−
. (73)
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Figure 27: Equityholders’ Pay-oﬀs
The values at  = 0 are,
  = 0 + (1− )
³ 
1−
´
− 
³ 
1−
´
=  ( ) + 
³ 
1−
´
−
h
 ( )− (1− )
³ 
1−
´i
  =
£− −  ( )¤−  ³ 1− ´+ h ( )− (1− ) ³ 1− ´i .
(74)
The shareholders’ payoﬀs for all four restructuring scenarios are depicted in Fig 27.
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